We revisit a classical load balancing problem in the modern context of decentralized systems and self-interested clients. In particular, there is a set of clients, each of whom must choose a server from a permissible set. Each client selfishly wants to minimize its own latency (job completion time). A server's latency is inversely proportional to its speed, but it grows linearly with (or, more generally, as the pth power of) the number of clients matched to it. This interaction is naturally modeled as an atomic congestion game, which we call selfish load balancing. We analyze the Nash equilibria of this game and prove nearly tight bounds on the price of anarchy (worst-case ratio between a Nash solution and the social optimum). In particular, for linear latency functions, we show that if the server speeds are relatively bounded and the number of clients is large compared to the number of servers, then every Nash assignment approaches social optimum. Without any assumptions on the number of clients, servers, and server speeds, the price of anarchy is at most 2.5. If all servers have the same speed, then the price of anarchy further improves to 1 + 2/ √ 3 ≈ 2.15. We also exhibit a lower bound of 2.01. Our proof techniques can also be adapted for the coordinated load balancing problem under L2 norm, where it slightly improves the best previously known upper bound on the competitive ratio of a simple greedy scheme.
INTRODUCTION
Consider a set U of n selfish clients, each of whom must choose a server from a set V , in the absence of a coordinating authority. There is a bipartite graph G between U and V and a server j is permissible for client i only if (i, j) is an edge in G. Each client selfishly wants to minimize its latency (job completion time), and rationally prefers a fast server to a slower one. Servers can have different speeds, and a server's latency is inversely proportional to its speed, but it is an increasing function of the server load (the number of clients served by it).
Each client independently trying to minimize its latency is essentially engaged in a game with other selfish clients. We call this the selfish load balancing game. Unlike traditional load balancing, however, the clients are not interested in optimizing the social welfare (e.g., total system-wide latency). Instead, each client has its own private objective. The stable outcomes of these interactions are the Nash Equilibriaoutcomes in which no single client can improve its latency by switching unilaterally. Centralized optimal solutions, in general, are not stable-one or more clients may improve their latency by switching, while worsening the latency for others. On the other hand, the cost of Nash equilibrium solutions can be much worse than that of centralized outcomes, and Papadimitriou [11] has coined the term "price of anarchy" to denote the worst-case ratio between a Nash outcome and the social optimum. In this paper, we give nearly tight bounds for the price of anarchy in the selfish load balancing game.
Nash equilibrium is a compelling solution concept for decentralized systems with self-interested players. Unfortunately, the concept is descriptive, not prescriptive: it does not suggest algorithms for computing an equilibrium and computing Nash equilibria remains a topic of current research. We, therefore, also investigate the following obvious greedy strategy: clients arrive in the system online in an arbitrary order; upon arrival, each client selects a permissible server with the least current latency, and this selection is irrevocable. The greedy is a myopic strategy-each client makes the best choice available to it at the moment, although future choices by other clients may make it regret that selection. While greedy does not generally lead to Nash solutions, it does have the advantage of computational sim-plicity. Thus, a natural question to ask is: how bad is the greedy assignment in the worst case?
The greedy strategy has been analyzed before in the context of centralized L2 norm load balancing [3] -the goal there is to assign clients so as to minimize the L2 norm of the server loads. Because the total latency of all the clients is intimately related to the squared sum of the server loads, our techniques also lead to improved bounds for the competitive ratio of the greedy scheme of [3] . Interestingly, the Nash solutions are strictly better, suggesting the following conclusion: despite lack of central coordination, selfish players find solutions that are better than greedy, which assumes centralized control but non-selfish players.
Model and Results
An instance of the load balancing game is modeled as a bipartite graph G between a set U of n clients and a set V of m servers. A client i can be assigned to server j only if (i, j) is an edge in G. An outcome of the game is an assignment where each client is assigned to one of its permissible servers. Suppose server j has speed σj and is matched to j clients, then we assume that the response time, or latency, to each client i connected to this server is λi = f ( j )/σj , where f () is an increasing function of the load j . (In general, there are two distinct contributors to a client's latency: the server load, and the network congestion. In this paper, we focus on the latency at the server, and treat the network latency to be a constant. Because the network topology as well as the IP route change continuously, the network latency is both unpredictable and difficult to model. One can incorporate a simplified network latency in our model by folding it in the server speed-then a server with a fast connection to the network can be distinguished from a similar server with a slow link. A more accurate modeling of the combined server and network latency seems challenging and is left for future work.)
The cost of an assignment M is the total latency of all the clients:
Under the linear model, the latency of server j is simply j /σj. More generally, we consider latency functions of the form
/σj, for any p ≥ 1. In that case, the cost of the matching is cost(M ) = È m j=1 p j /σj, which corresponds to the pth power of the weighted Lp norm of the server loads.
A Nash equilibrium assignment is one in which no client can improve its latency by unilaterally switching to another server. Let M nash be a Nash solution, and let Mopt be the (coordinated) social optimum. The price of anarchy is the worst-case bound on the ratio between the costs of M nash and Mopt.
Our first result concerns the price of anarchy with linear latency functions. We show that if the server speeds are relatively bounded and the number of clients is large compared to the number of servers, then every Nash assignment approaches social optimum. Without any assumptions on the number of clients, servers, and server speeds, the price of anarchy is at most 2.5. If all servers have the same speed, then we can improve the upper bound to (1+2/ √ 3) ≈ 2.15. We also give a lower bound construction showing that the price of anarchy can be at least 2.01, even with equal speed servers and linear latency.
We next consider higher order monomial latency functions. In this case, we measure the Lp norm of the server loads, and show that the price of anarchy is (p/ log p) ( 
We then apply our technique to reanalyze a simple but centralized greedy scheme for load balancing. The best result known for this problem is due to Awerbuch et al. [3] , who show that the greedy achieves the competitive ratio (1+ √ 2) 2 ≈ 5.83 for the squared L2 norm of the server loads. We show that if the servers have arbitrary speeds, then the competitive ratio of the greedy is at most 17/3 ≈ 5.67; more significantly, if all the servers have the same speed, then we can improve the competitive ratio to 2 + √ 5 ≈ 4.24.
Motivation and Related Work
Our load balancing game is inspired by the emerging class of Internet-centric applications like the peer to peer (P2P) networks, but it has broader implications for any uncoordinated distributed system. In a P2P system, for instance, data are often replicated to enable a high level of availability and fault tolerance. Thus, users typically have choice of many hosts from whom to download their data; each user wants to minimize its own latency (time to download); and there is no central authority to dictate a user's choice.
The load balancing game belongs to the general class of congestion games introduced by Rosenthal [13] in game theory. In these games, a set of players compete for a set of resources, and the cost of each resource depends only on the number of players using it. A key game-theoretic property of these games is that they always have at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus, in our work, we focus on pure strategy Nash equilibria.
In computer science, perhaps the best known congestion game is the network routing, studied by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [8] , Czumaj and Vöcking [6] , Roughgarden [15] , and Roughgarden and Tardos [16] , among others.
The routing problem studied in [8, 6] is similar to our load balancing problem, but there are two differences. First, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [8] are concerned with the maximum latency over parallel links, whereas we are concerned with the total latency. Second, in their model, the user-link bipartite graph is complete, while we allow partial graphseach user shall be matched to only a permissible server.
Roughgarden and Tardos [16] generalize the selfish routing to arbitrary networks and consider the total flow latency, but their model differs from our load balancing game in two important ways. First, Roughgarden and Tardos treat flows as non-atomic, meaning that a user's task (flow) can be split arbitrarily (across multiple paths). By contrast, in atomic games, one user is wholly assigned to a single server. (For the non-atomic version of the selfish load balancing, we can show the price of anarchy is one; that is, Nash is always optimal.) Second, in selfish routing, each user is assumed to put only a negligible traffic load on a network link. We do not require such an assumption-a user can own an arbitrarily large fraction of a host.
While the lack of coordination and selfish agents are relatively new concerns, the problem of assigning clients (jobs) to servers (machines) dates back to the earliest days of distributed computing or scheduling, and there is an enormous literature on it. A small sample of these results includes the following: [7, 12, 14] investigate the online assignment of unit length jobs under the L∞ norm; [1, 9] consider offline assignments of unit length jobs; [2, 4, 5] consider greedy assignment of weighted jobs under the Lp norm, where the client-server graph is complete bipartite; [10] considers dynamic load balancing under the Lp norm. The work most relevant to us is the L2 norm load balancing with an arbitrary client-server graph [3] . Because the total latency of the clients is related to the squared L2 norm of the server loads, the setting of Awerbuch et al. [3] can be viewed as the coordinated or centralized version of our problem.
Organization
Our paper is organized as following. In Section 2, we establish two key results (Nash Condition and Nash Inequality), which are central to our analysis. In Section 3, we prove upper bounds on the price of anarchy with linear latency functions, and also show a lower bound construction. In Section 4, we extend our analysis to the latency functions under the Lp norm. In Section 5, we present our improved analysis of the greedy assignment scheme. Finally, we offer some conclusions and open problems in Section 6.
PRELIMINARIES
Our primary model is the linear latency model : if a server has load and speed σ then each of its clients experiences latency λ = /σ. If server j has load j and speed σj in an assignment M , then the assignment has cost È m j=1 2 j /σj , which is the weighted sum of the squares of server loads. We will consider higher order monomial latency functions in Section 4.
An assignment is a Nash equilibrium if no single client can improve its latency by unilaterally switching to another (permissible) server. Given an instance of the client-server problem, let Mopt denote an assignment realizing the social optimum, and let M nash denote a Nash assignment. For server j, let Oj and Nj denote the set of clients assigned to j in Mopt and M nash , respectively. We use the shorthand notation oj = |Oj | and nj = |Nj | for the cardinalities of these sets. The following lemma notes a simple but crucial condition imposed by a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2.1 (Nash Condition).
Given an optimal assignment Mopt and a Nash assignment M nash , the following inequality holds for any two servers j, k, where σj, σ k are the speeds of these servers:
Proof. If k = j or Nj ∩ O k = ∅, then the argument is trivially true, so assume that k = j and Nj ∩ O k = ∅. Pick an arbitrary client i ∈ Nj ∩ O k . This client has latency nj /σj in the Nash assignment M nash . The server k is also permissible for i because i ∈ O k . By switching to k, the client i can achieve latency (n k + 1)/σ k . By the equilibrium property, this latency is the same or worse than its latency in M nash . Thus, nj /σj ≤ (n k + 1)/σ k . This simple Nash Condition leads to the following important inequality, which is the main basis for our upper bound analysis. (Later, we will prove a similar inequality for the greedy assignments.) Lemma 2.2 (Nash Inequality). Given an optimal assignment Mopt and a Nash assignment M nash , the following inequality holds:
Proof. Since the sets O k , k = 1, 2, . . . , m, partition the set of clients, we have that nj
for every k. Using these equalities, we can rewrite the total cost of a Nash assignment as follows:
In this chain of inequalities, we used the fact (nj /σj
. This is trivially true if |Nj ∩O k | = 0; otherwise, it follows from Inequality (1).
Finally we present a technical lemma which will be used later. The proof uses standard Langarian multiplier method and is omitted in this extended abstract. 
BOUNDS ON THE PRICE OF ANARCHY
In this section, we prove upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy. We prove three different upper bounds. The first upper bound (Theorem 3.1) is in terms of n (number of clients), m (number of servers), and the server speeds. This bound is the sharpest in the limit when m/n → 0 and the ratio between the maximum and the minimum server speed is bounded. For instance, if all servers have equal speed and m/n approaches 0, then Theorem 3.1 says that every Nash approaches the social optimum. For arbitrary values of m, n and server speeds, our second bound (Theorem 3.2) is the best. It shows that the price of anarchy is at most 2.5 for any choice of n, m and server speeds. Finally, if all servers have the same speed, then Theorem 3.3 shows that the price of anarchy is at most (1 + 2/ √ 3) ≈ 2.15. We also gives a lower bound construction showing that the price of anarchy is at least 2.01, even with equal speed servers. (This lower bound dashed our original hope that the true price of anarchy was 2.) 
Proof. By using Nash inequality (2) and the fact that nj oj ≤ (n
By Lemma 2.3, we get the desired result immediately.
Next, we give an upper bound of 2.5 independent of n, m and server speeds. Proof. Suppose that Mopt = {Oj | 1 ≤ j ≤ m} is an optimal assignment and M nash = {Nj | 1 ≤ j ≤ m} is a Nash assignment. Fix an index j, it is straightforward to verify the following equality:
The Nash Inequality (2) together with the above inequality implies the following:
Thus, in order to show
it suffices to prove that
The preceding inequality is equivalent to the following simplified form
It holds trivially if either oj = 0 or oj ≥ 2. Because oj is an integer, thus the only remaining case is oj = 1, and in this case the above inequality is equivalent to 1/4 ≤ (nj − 3/2) 2 . Because nj is an integer, thus this holds, and the whole proof is complete.
An Improved Upper Bound for Equal Speed Servers
In this section, we show a further improvement in the upper bound when all servers have the same speed. The upper bound in this case turns out to be 1 + 2/ √ 3 ≈ 2.15, which is getting quite close to the lower bound of 2.01, shown in the next subsection. Without loss of generality, we assume that all servers have the unit speed. Thus, cost(M nash ) = 
Theorem 3.3. If all servers have equal speed and the latency function is linear, then the price of anarchy is at most cost(M
Proof. In order to prove the upper bound cost(M nash ) ≤ (2/ √ 3 + 1) cost(Mopt), it is enough to prove the following:
By Lemma 2.2 together with σj = 1 and
, it is thus sufficient to show that
and it is equivalent to
Let xj = (1, 0), k pairs of (1, 1), and one pair of
Let b/a approximate ( √ 3 − 1)/2. As a goes to infinity, the above ratio approaches 1 + 2/ √ 3.
A Lower Bound
We now describe a construction showing that the worstcase price of anarchy is at least 2.01; Our lower bound holds even if all servers have equal speed. Theorem 3.4. In the worst case, the following lower bound holds for the price of anarchy:
Proof. For every k ∈ AE, k ≥ 2, we describe a bipartite graph G = (U, V ) along with an optimal assignment Mopt and a Nash assignment M nash . Both V and U are partitioned into k
The permissible set of every u ∈ Ui is Vi ∪ Vi+1 for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, and V k for i = k. We set the cardinalities of the server and client groups such that the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) Every server in Vi, i = 0, 1, . . . , k, has the same load in M nash and in Mopt, which we denote by ni and oi, respectively. In particular, ni = i and oi ≥ 1 is a slowlyincreasing sequence. (ii) Every job in Ui, i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, is assigned to a client of Vi in Mopt, but to a client of Vi+1 in M nash . It is easy to see that Mopt is optimal and M nash is a Nash assignment under the two conditions.
Once we have fixed the value of oi's, we can calculate the cardinalities of Vi, Ui with the following procedure: Let
and ni+1|Vi+1| otherwise; and let |Vi| = |Ui|/oi. The value of x will be the minimum value such that all the cardinalities are integers.
1 For k = 7, x = 4, o0 = . . . = o3 = 1 < o4 = . . . = o7 = 2, we have a total of 4919 servers, cost(M nash ) = 10606 and cost(Mopt) = 5276. The price of anarchy is 2 + 27/2638 > 2.01. If k goes to infinity, the price of anarchy slightly increases but it does not significantly exceed 2.01. 
PRICE OF ANARCHY IN L P NORM
In this section, we consider higher order monomial latency functions, and use Lp norm to measure the cost of an assignment. For any constant p ≥ 1, we assume that a server with load and speed σ has latency p−1 /σ. Thus, each of the j clients matched with server j incurs latency λj
The Lp norm measure of the total latency is (
The case p = 1 is the extreme case where a server's latency is independent of its load-in such a case, all Nash equilibria are optimal. Thus, the interesting cases are only when p > 1. Our main result in this subsection shows that the price of anarchy with this latency measure is (p/ log p) (1 + o(1) ). (By comparison, the greedy scheme of Awerbuch et al. [3] , discussed in the next section, has competitive ratio 1.77p(1+o(1)) for greedy.) Proof. Let M nash be a Nash assignment and Mopt be an optimal assignment, then cost(M nash ) = (
and cost(Mopt) = (
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
ANALYSIS OF GREEDY
The cost of an assignment is related to the squared sum of the server loads. An elegant result of Awerbuch et al. [3] shows that a simple online greedy scheme achieves competitive ratio (1 + √ 2) 2 ≈ 5.83 for this measure of centralized load balancing. The greedy assigns each client to a permissible server so as to minimize the increase in the total objective. Specifically, a client is assigned to server j that minimizes the quantity
. The greedy scheme does not, in general, lead to equilibrium assignments. However, it does have a computational advantage-it is easy to implement. While the greedy policy above is designed for optimizing the social welfare, it is also a natural selfish strategy. Each client is essentially choosing the best possible server at the time it makes its selection. When all servers have equal speed, each client is simply choosing the server with minimum load. With arbitrary speeds, the greedy asks each client to choose the server j that minimizes j +0.5 σ j ; a true selfish strategy for the client would minimize
. This minor change in the priority has a minuscule effect on our bounds.
In this section, we reanalyze the greedy scheme and present improved bounds on its competitive ratio. The basis for our analysis is the following Greedy Inequality: 
Summing up these increments for i from 1 to n, we get
In the above chain of inequalities, we used the fact that i−1,j ≤ gj for all i, j and
The proof is complete.
With the Greedy Inequality, we can prove the following theorem. 
Proof. By using the Greedy Inequality (11) and the fact that 2gjoj ≤ (1/2)g
For arbitrary values of n, m and arbitrary server speeds, our second theorem gives an upper bound of 17/3 ≈ 5.67, which is a slight improvement over the ( √ 2 + 1) 2 ≈ 5.83 bound proved in [3] . Proof. It is easy to verify the following equality:
From Lemma 5.1, we know that
In order to prove
The above inequality can be simplified to the following:
This inequality is obviously true if oj = 0 or oj ≥ 2. Because oj is an integer, thus for the only remaining case, oj = 1, the inequality simplifies to 1/4 ≤ (gj − 5/2)
2 . This holds because gj is an integer, and the whole proof is complete.
An Improved Bound for Equal Speed Servers
If all servers have the same speeds then we can further improve the upper bound for the greedy. First, theorem 5. Proof. In order to prove the inequality cost(M greedy ) ≤ (2 + √ 5)cost(Mopt), it is enough to prove the following:
. (12) Lemma 5.1, together with the fact σj = 1 and
È m j=1 ojgj . To prove Eq. (12) , it suffices to show the following:
gj, then Eq. (13) We prove Eq. (13) by induction on m. The inductive proof is similar to the proof of Eq. (5) in Theorem 3.3 and we omit the details. Because Eq. (13) holds, thus the whole proof is complete.
Some lower bounds
The bound of Theorem 5.4 is the best possible using only the Greedy Inequality. Consider the following example: There are a pairs of (1, 0), k pairs of (1, 1) and one pair of
Let b/a approximate ( √ 5 − 1)/2. As a goes to infinity, the above ratio approaches 2 + √ 5. The following theorem establishes that the cost of greedy is strictly more than 3 times the optimal in the worst case. The cost of an optimal assignment, which assigns job i to server min{i, 64}, is cost(Mopt) = 63 + 9 = 72. One worst-case greedy assignment maps each client 1, 2, . . . , 64 to a permissible server minimizing the increase in L2 norm, it breaks ties by choosing the server with higher index. Its cost amounts to cost(M greedy ) = 16+8· 2 2 +4· 3 2 +2· 4 2 +1· 5 2 + 1 · 9 2 = 222. Thus, the ratio cost(M greedy )/cost(Mopt) = 3 + 1/12 ≈ 3.08 > 3.
CLOSING REMARKS
The users of a decentralized systems like the Internet are sometimes best modeled as selfish and strategic players, who want to optimize their own private utility. Our selfish load balancing game models one such fundamental situation, where a set of clients must each choose a server. We showed that the worst-case Nash solution of this game is within a small constant factor of the social optimum.
The sum of the clients' latency is related to the squared sum of the server loads. In that respect, our problem can also be viewed as the uncoordinated version of the classical L2 norm load balancing [3] . We reanalyzed the simple online greedy scheme and gave improved bounds on its competitive ratio.
The uncoordinated greedy scheme can also be viewed as a myopic strategy for the clients: they choose the best server available when they arrive and are not allowed to switch afterwards. By contrast, a Nash solution requires that clients reach a stable point, where no client has an incentive to switch. Our analysis shows that, despite lack of central coordination, selfish players find solutions that are better than greedy, which assumes centralized control but non-selfish players.
Interestingly, the Nash and the greedy can be viewed as two extremes of a server switching cost model-in greedy, the cost to switch is infinite; in Nash, it is zero. An intriguing open question is to investigate the tradeoffs of a finite switching cost. Another open question relates to the effect of server speeds. Our upper bounds are better for equal speed servers, but we know of no lower bound construction that gives a worse solution for arbitrary speeds than equal speeds. Do arbitrary speeds help or hurt the price of anarchy? Finally, there remains a small gap between our upper and lower bounds for the equal speed servers, and it would be interesting to determine where the truth lies.
